Stephanus 218

218a4ff.: Theaetetus: "Act in this way, then, Stranger, and just as Socrates said you will have been gracious to all."

Compared to how eager Theaetetus is to converse with the Stranger, you can see how reluctant the Stranger was to embark on the conversation. He knows it's going to be a long discussion--and he doesn't want it to seem like he's showing off. And he makes it sound like he's only willing to do it because it would be bad manners to do otherwise.

Theaetetus, on the other hand, is all but pleading with the Stranger to agree to embark on the discussion. That's a good sign. He also picks up on one of the words the Stranger used--"not to be gracious to you ... appears to me to be unbefitting a stranger and wild"--"Act in this way ... and ... you will have been gracious to all." So, Theaetetus is really listening to the Stranger and responding to what he said. 

"Act in this way" is also interesting. The verb (δρᾶ) is used when referring to doing "some great thing, good or bad"--according to the lexicon. Act as in "drama." It's also interesting that Theaetetus uses the future passive tense here--"you will have been gracious to all"--so, he's envisioning the conversation as a whole completed action or drama--and once the Stranger has completed it he will have been gracious.

Stranger: "Probably about these things, on the one hand (πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα ), nothing still needs to be said. On the other hand, as to what comes next (τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο), the speech--as is likely--would now become directed toward you [but literally and in parallel to the beginning of the sentence,] about you (πρὸς δὲ σὲ)."

Another indication that what follows will be more about Theaetetus than it will be about the sophist.

"If, therefore, you are at all weighed down by the length of the toils, do not blame me for these things, but these your companions here."

Theaetetus will be so tired by the end of this dialogue that they will decide to switch him out with Young Socrates at the beginning of the Statesman so that Theaetetus can rest. But he will make it to the end of this long conversation.

Theaetetus: But, on the one hand, I think that as things now stand, I will not get worn out. If, on the other hand, some such thing happens, we will lay hold of Socrates here--who is the namesake of Socrates but is my peer and exercise partner (συγγυμναστήν)--for whom it is not uncharacteristic to toil constantly (συνδιαπονεῖν) at many things together with me.

Theaetetus does end up making it to the end of the conversation about the Sophist--which means he is a hard worker with lots of endurance (he engaged in a long conversation with  Socrates on the day before). Young Socrates, on the other hand, will end up being characterized (in the Statesman) by his unwillingness to do work. See Statesman 258c9ff:

Theaetetus is marked by temperance without courage; Young Socrates will be marked by courage without temperance--if you put them together (as those who exercise together), you get the philosopher.

Also, my guess is that the Stranger combines both--and so is the philosopher. He is mentioned as an afterthought in both the Sophist and the Statesman.

Theodorus: we ourselves have come and are bringing this Stranger here (216a1-2).

Socrates: Thank you so much, Theodorus, for the knowledge of Theaetetus and at the same time for that of the Stranger.

This remind me a bit of the movie Inception. The first time you watch it you think the movie is about the main storyline--implanting an idea in the mind of the son. Then the next time you realize the movie is about the DiCaprio character being freed from the guilt he feels for causing his wife's death. In this trilogy, you go from focusing on what is said about the topics being discussed, to focusing on Theaetetus/Young Socrates, to focusing on the Stranger.

YS: This is now becomes your work, I think, Stranger, not mine.

Str: But it must be your work also, Socrates ....

Stranger: You speak well, and you will decide privately as the speech proceeds; but now in common with me it it is necessary for you to co-examine--you must start now, as it appears to me, from the sophist, and you must seek and make it apparent in speech what at any time he is.

What's neat about this--especially in contrast to the way Young Socrates will later behave--is that the Stranger makes it clear that this is the work of Theaetetus--all of these verbs are singular in number and refer back to Theaetetus--the task is not spoken of as belonging to both of them (as in "we will start, we will seek, we will make apparent").

"For as of now both you and I have concerning this one the name alone in common, but perhaps each of us has privately the work by which we name (call) him;"

This is the second time in the first part of the speech that the Stranger has contrasted "in common" (κοινῇ) with "privately" (ἰδίᾳ)--it must be important.

Also, it's a bit unexpected to hear Stranger speak of the "work" (ἔργον) by which we name the sophist; especially with all the talk about the toils they are about to undertake, as well as the Stranger telling Young Socrates in the Statesman that the "work" must become his.

"But concerning everything it is always necessary for us to have come into agreement together about the matter (τὸ πρᾶγμα) itself through speeches than about the name alone without a speech."  

Perhaps this is the difference between a sophist and a philosopher: the sophist is concerned with the name and the philosopher is concerned with the matter itself.

For example, a sophist might say: a sophist is a counterfeit philosopher--that is, a sophist appears to be a philosopher but is not. That statement, while correct, would not tell you anything about what a sophist is or what a philosopher is; it would only tell you that a sophist is not a philosopher, but for some reason seems to people to be a philosopher.

Also, a sophist would be called a philosopher--would be called by the name philosopher--without possessing the thing itself that makes a philosopher a philosopher.

Also, if you are talking about something in common with someone else, there's a greater likelihood that it will be about something that actually exists (especially if there is some disagreement) than if you are just thinking about something privately.

In The Place of the Lion, Damaris Tighe is more interested in the names of things than the realities that the names represent (this is what Abelard thought, this is what Plotinus thought, etc.). Then the realities swoop down on her, and she is converted.

"But the tribe that we now intend to seek is not the easiest of all to comprehend what it is--the sophist."

Interesting that the Stranger speaks of a tribe rather than a genus or species--that is, something having an eidos. But how can the sophist have an eidos if he does not exist (is only the counterfeit of something else)?

"Yet as many of the big things as it is necessary to toil constantly over (διαπονεῖσθαι) beautifully, it has seemed to all concerning such things that it is necessary to practice on (μελετᾶν) them first in small and easy things before [studying them] in the big things themselves."

The "toiling constantly" mentioned by the Stranger points back to the "toiling constantly together" that Theaetetus mentions earlier in connection to his working out with Young Socrates. 

"So now, Theaetetus, I at least advise the pair of us in this way: that, having supposed that the genus of the sophist is difficult and hard to hunt, we first practice beforehand (προμελετᾶν) the pursuit of him in some other easier thing, unless from some place or other you are able (ἔχεις) to speak of some other more easy-going path."  

The Stranger speaks here of the genus of the sophist (singular). Would it be more typical to speak of the genus of sophists?

Theaetetus: But I am not able (οὐκ ἔχω).

Theaetetus does not show any desire to avoid the hard work.

Stranger: So, then (δῆτα) do you want us--by pursuing one of the lesser things--to try to lay it down as a paradigm of the greater thing?

Theaetetus: Yes.

Stranger: So (δῆτα), what might we arrange before [ourselves]--on the one hand, well known and small, on the other hand, having a speech less than none of the great things? For example, an angler. Is he not known to all and not at all worthy of much serious attention?

Theaetetus: [That is] so.

Cornford find this whole section (218d-230e) so unimportant that he actually leaves it out of his translation (!). Not to be too hard on him, but maybe he is lacking a virtue that the Stranger and Theaetetus possess--a willingness to do the work necessary in laying down the foundation for defining the sophist--a work that is said to be necessary because the sophist "is not the easiest of all to comprehend what it is." (Presumably Cornford though the teaching contained in the Sophist was expressed in the definition of the sophist that the pair arrive at by the end of the dialogue--than which nothing could be further from the truth.)

So, if Cornford were the interlocutor instead of Theaetetus:

S: So, Professor Cornford, my advice is that we practice on something easier before embarking on our search for the Stranger--unless you can point out easier path..

C: Nonsense, Stranger, what you propose would be a complete waste of our time. Of course I have a better idea--let's skip the preliminaries and get straight to the sophist.

S: So, you don't want to set up, say, an angler as a paradigm first?

C: Absolutely not--let's get started now.

What do we learn from this exercise? A lot!

In the Charmides, the key pattern is first ... then; proton ... epeita; in other words, temperance is a willingness to do first things first and second things second (examining before knowing). So, Professor Cornford is displaying intemperance--he wants to jump right to the juicy second part without going through the necessary first part. What does that mean for us. In his willingness to join the Stranger in the preliminary discussion--and not take a more "easy-going" path, Theaetetus demonstrating the virtue of temperance--first, then.

Perhaps the mark of the philosopher is to treat things that are difficult to understand as difficult to understand--and the mark of the sophist is to treat things that are difficult to understand as easy to understand.

So, not only is the sophist a counterfeit of the philosopher, but his so-called wisdom is a counterfeit of real wisdom.