Stephanus 221

S: The part of striking that is opposite to this, happening by hook, and one hits not the body of the fish, as with tridents, but around the head and mouth of the one that is hunted on each occasion, and pulling up in the opposite direction--from below upward--by means of rods and reeds; of which what, Theaetetus, shall we say the name must be called?

T: I for my part am of the opinion (δοκῶ μέν) that the very thing that we put forward as necessary to discover, this very thing has now been brought to completion.

This answer is a bit tentative--there is no thinking verb used here, just Theaetetus stating his opinion. He also uses μέν solitarium (μέν not followed by δέ), which Smyth (2896) says "emphasizes a statement made by a person with reference to himself as opposed to others." So, again, a bit tentative--Theaetetus is not presuming to speak for anyone else--probably because he's not sure.

S: Now, therefore, concerning the art of angling, both you and I have not only agreed on the name but, but we have also seized adequately the speech about the work itself. For of all art taken together, there was the half part that has to do with acquiring  (κτητικὸν), and of the acquiring part the part that has to do with conquering (χειρωτικόν), and of the part that has to do with conquering the part that has to do with hunting  (θηρευτικόν), and of the hunting part the part that has to do with animal hunting (ζῳοθηρικόν), and of the animal hunting part the part that has to do with hunting in water, and of the part that has to do with hunting in water the part from below has to do with the whole section of fishing, and of the part that has to do with fishing the part that has to do with striking, and of the part that has to do with striking the part that has to do with fish hooks. Of this one part is concerned with the art of striking that is pulled up from below, the name having been made like the action itself, the art that was sought has now come to be--the art of angling by name.

T: Absolutely--this at least has been adequately made clear.

The Stranger does a good job of remembering the divisions--everything he says is accurate. The only thing he adds is when he describes the art of fishing (as opposed to the art of duck-hunting) as "from below."

Also, both Theaetetus and the Stranger say that they have defined the angler "adequately."

The Stranger emphasizes that he and Theaetetus did this together--"both you and I."

S: Come, then: according to this paradigm shall we try to discover the sophist as well--whatever he is?

T: Absolutely (κομιδῇ)

I don't remember ever seeing this response--for what it's worth, this word is from a verb that means to take care of or receive hospitably (κομίζω) and is always use to talk about the care bestowed on horses in the Odyssey (L-S).

S: And that was the first thing that was sought--whether one must place the angler as a layman (ἰδιώτην) or as one having an art.

T: Yes.

S: Shall we now place this man as a layman, Theaetetus, or absolutely as truly a sophist?

T: In no way a layman; for I know what you are saying--that anyone who has this name at least is far from being that kind of person.

Strange. Theaetetus thinks that the Stranger is pointing him in the direction of thinking the sophist has an art--by asking a leading or loaded question. Maybe it was a loaded question. But if a sophist is a counterfeit philosopher--why assume that he has an art--by which he obtains something good?

S: But we must, as is likely, place him as one who has a certain art.

Not a lot of certainty here.

T: So, what in the world is this art?

S: By the gods! Have we failed to recognize (ἠγνοήκαμεν) that the man is a kinsman of the man?

T: Who is the kinsman of whom?

S: The angler is the kinsman of the sophist.

T: In what way?

S: The couple appear to me to be hunters.

T: Of what hunting (θήρας) is th'other (ἅτερος)? For we spoke, on the one hand, of the other one.

S: We divided in two just now, I suppose, all hunting (τὴν ἄγραν)--of a swimming part and that of a part on land--when we were cutting.

T: Yes.

The Stranger introduces a different word to refer to hunting--not just here, but different from the one used earlier. They divided θηρευτικὴν in two, not τὴν ἄγραν. Notice that the first is "the art of hunting" and the second is just hunting. So, does the sophist really have an art? 

The Stranger also made a big deal of this division: "It does not make any sense ( it is ἄλογον) not to divide the art of hunting in two." And he doesn't divide the art into hunting water animals and hunting land animals. He divided into hunting inanimate and inanimate things. To which Theaetetus replies, "if indeed both exist as a couple." This may indicate a problem in regarding the sophist and the angler as a couple (that is, of both having an art, the art of hunting).

I think they're getting off to a bad start. They should never have assumed that the sophist has an art and that he is a hunter just like the angler. That is jumping to a conclusion without any kind of investigation--it is intemperate--the kind of thing a sophist might do--or just one who is not good at searching.

S: And the one we went through--as much as had to do with the things that swim of the things that are in water; but as for the on land part (τὸ δὲ πεζὸν) we let it be undivided, after we said that it was of many species.