Stephanus 224

 S: Let us say then that music taken altogether, on each occasion from city to city bought from here, on the one hand, and led and sold there on the other, both painting and juggling (θαυματοποιικὴν) and many other things of the soul--some things being led and sold for the sake of entertainment and others for the sake of being serious--the one who leads and sells would display [himself] as being correctly called a merchant  in no way less than the selling of food and drink.

A strange sentence to say the least--there is no verb given until the very last word of the sentence--display (παρασχεῖν). Which is itself a strange word--there is no obvious way to translate it either here or when it used to describe the apparition that rises up to indicate that they made a mistake in thinking that the sophist was a kind of hunter (at 223c3).

T: What you say is most true.

S: Won't you address the one who buys up things that can be learned from city to city--exchanging them for money--by the same name.

T: Yes, yes, with all my heart! (σφόδρα γε)

Theaetetus is super-excited--he can just smell it--they found the sophist again! But he's way too excited--this is going to turn out to be wrong as well.

S: Of this art of soul merchantry, wouldn't the one [part] be most justly called the art of displaying (ἐπιδεικτικὴ), and as for the other, is there not a necessity to address it--being a selling of things that can be learned- by a name no less ridiculous than the one before, but nevertheless a brother of the action?

T: Absolutely.

Another strange sentence. The word ridiculous is separated from the word it modifies (name) by lots of words--the first comes near the beginning of the sentence and the other near the end. Greek can do this--but why?

Why "absolutely"? Theaetetus doesn't even know what the name is yet. Why is there a necessity to call it a ridiculous name (as opposed, for example, to most justly)?

S: Of the selling of things that can be learned, then, one must address the one that is concerned with the things that can be learned about other arts by a different [name] (ἑτέρῳ) and the one that is concerned with [what can be learned about] virtue by another [name].

T: Of course.

Strange to use two different words for other; strange also to drop out the word  μαθήμα (something that can be learned) when speaking about virtue.

S: It would certainly be fitting to call the one concerning the other things "art selling"; but you be eager to say the name if the one concerning these things.

T: And why--if someone said that it it would be another name than the one now being sought--the genus of sophistry--would it not strike a false note?

S: There is no other. Come, let us put it all together now and say that the trade of offering virtue for sale--of the art of acquisition (τῆς κτητικῆς), of the art of exchange (μεταβλητικῆς), of the art of commerce (ἀγοραστικῆς), of the art of commerce (ἐμπορικῆς), of the art of soul-commerce (ψυχεμπορικῆς) concerning speeches and things that can be learned--appeared second as the art of sophistry.

T: Very much so.

Another bizarre sentence in which the word "the" is separated from the word it goes with "trade of offering virtue for sale" by almost the entire length of the sentence.

Is the string of divisions correct?


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Stephanus 223a1-b8

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