Stephanus p. 216

 216a1ff.: "According to yesterday's agreement, Socrates, we have come: both we ourselves--in an orderly way--and we are also bringing this stranger ...."

Yesterday's agreement was "But at dawn, Theodorus, let's meet here again." The agreement did not include coming back with Theaetetus, let along the Stranger. The separation (indicated by te ... kai) indicates that "in an orderly way" refers to the coming of Theodorus (and Theaetetus)  but not of the Stranger. Bringing the Stranger along was not part of the agreement and so is not orderly.

"He is a companion of the ones around Parmenides and Zeno--a real man, a philosopher."

I recall from my days studying Parmenides that for Parmenides Being (to on)--is something from which all otherness is banished--it is and stays the same no matter how you look at it--time, place, dimension, never undergoing any change, etc.

From my study of the The Statesman for my dissertation: a main point of The Statesman is that the dialectical virtues of temperance and courage (or manliness) are not even virtues when they are separated from one another, but when they are combined they become virtues essential to seeking and finding wisdom. Young Socrates has manliness (courage) uncombined with temperance (cf. especially Politikos 262a5ff.); Theaetetus (based on reading it through recently in English) has temperance uncombined with courage. Perhaps the Stranger has both combined; at any rate, a philosopher would need to have both combined to be successful in his search for truth.

"So, Theodorus, have you brought not a stranger but a god without realizing it--in accordance with the saying of Homer? Who says both that other gods [accompany] human beings, as many as partake of just modesty, and what is more, that no less than [Zeus] the god of strangers--becoming a companion--looks down on both the outrages and lawful deeds of men."

Socrates botches these passages from Homer, and since it is unlikely that Plato misremembered them, the botching is likely to have some meaning.

The first passage is from Odyssey IX.269ff.  (Odysseus speaking to the Cyclops):

"But have shame [or modesty] before the gods, best [of creatures]; we come as suppliants, you know. Zeus is the avenger of suppliants and strangers--the god of strangers, who accompanies modest (or shame-faced) strangers."

The second passage is from Odyssey XVII.485ff. (One of the suitors speaking to Antinoos--right after Antinoos throws a foot stool at a person who looks like a beggar but is really a recently returned Odysseus): 

"The gods--looking like strangers from other lands--becoming all kinds of people--visit cities, looking upon both the outrage and lawfulness (eunomia) of men."

The mistake Socrates makes is that in the Cyclops scene, Odysseus says that Zeus accompanies respectful strangers--but Socrates says that "other gods" accompany them; and, whereas the suitor says that "the gods ... look upon the outrage and lawfulness of men," Socrates says that "Zeus looks down upon the outrages and lawful deeds of  men."

So, Socrates at the very least is confusing singulars with plurals--where there are many gods, Socrates speaks of one--and where there is one god, Socrates speaks of many. Socrates also speaks of outrages and lawfulnesses, where the suitor speaks of outrage and lawfulness.

Socrates also slips in--or Plato slips in--to the paraphrase of the words of Odysseus to the Cyclops a word that Plato likes to use when speaking of many things participating in one eidos--"the human beings partake of (metechousin) just shame (or modesty or reverence or respect)." My guess is that many things partaking of one eidos and the confusion of seeing one when there are many and seeing many where is one will show up again later in the conversation.

In re-reading the books in Homer's Odyssey leading up to the suitors speech to Antinoos, I noticed that Odysseus is referred to many times as a xeinos--a stranger--so it makes one wonder if there is some connection between the Eleatic Stranger and Odysseus. Odysseus returned and is about to take vengeance on the suitors. What exactly is Socrates afraid of? No doubt, he is just being playful. 

Also, in this scene, the suitor is rebuking Antinoos-- which means "in opposition to intellect"--not a good thing to be in a Platonic dialogue (or in Homer, apparently).

Im support of identifying Odysseus and the Stranger: these are the lines right before the ones Socrates paraphrases (in the speech of the suitor):

"Antinoos, it was not a fine thing for you to strike the unfortunate wander, and you are lost if he is perhaps a heavenly god...." (17.483-484).

Since Socrates explicitly says that the Stranger may be a god, it certainly sounds as if Socrates is regarding the Stranger as a kind of Odysseus returning to take vengeance on wrongdoers.

Also, in regard to aidos--shame--a word that occurs several times in the Homer passages and in Socrates' paraphrase: Penelope and others say of the beggar (who is really Odysseus) that it is not good for a beggar to have shame--this is repeated several times right before and after the suitor's speech. It makes me think of Socrates as someone who is known as a kind of beggar who shamelessly admits that he lacks wisdom. (It's also worth noting that the verb is lacking in the first part of Socrates' paraphrase--it's not clear what the gods do for human beings who partake of just shame).

216b3ff.: "So this one probably follows along with you [as] one of the mightier ones in order to look upon and refute us who are weak in arguments (logoi), he being a certain god who specializes in refuting people."

Since when is Socrates concerned about being refuted, since he is always going around refuting people who have weak arguments?

Theodorus: "This is not the way, Socrates, of the Stranger; but he is more measured (metrios) than those who are intent on disputes. He does not in any way seem to me to be a god, but rather divine. For I address all philosophers as such."

That "tropos" (this is not the "way" of the Stranger) makes me think again of Odysseus--who is so often described as "polutropos."

Socrates: "You do well, my friend. But there is a good chance that this genus is not much easier to distinguish than that of the god, as they say. For these men (andres) certainly--appearing as all kinds of people on account of the ignorance of others--"visit cities"--those who are not counterfeits but who are really philosophers--looking down from on high on the life of the ones below..."

Finally, we get a direct quotation of Homer's words--highlighting all the ways Socrates' paraphrase deviates from it.

For example, Socrates is really doubling down on "looking down" (kathorontes)--he uses it here and in his earlier paraphrase (kathoran, 216b2). Homer uses "look upon" (ephorontes). In Homer, the gods come down to our level and look upon us; in the telling of Socrates, Zeus--and the philosophers-- look down on us from on high.

"...and to some they seem worthy of nothing and to others of everything; sometimes they appear as statesmen, at other times as sophists, and at other times there are some to whom they may give the idea that they are mad. But I would be pleased to learn from the Stranger, if it  would be pleasing (dear) to him, what the people around that place suppose that these things are and [what do they] name [them]."

Theodorus: "Exactly what kind of things do you mean?

Socrates: "Sophist, statesman, philosopher."

So, it is fitting that a dialogue about the sophist begins with a number of people or things appearing to be one thing but really being another:

1. Odysseus appearing as a beggar but really being Odysseus just returned to Ithaca from his wanderings.

2. Gods appearing as strangers but really being gods.

3. Some people appearing as philosophers but not really being philosophers.

4. Philosophers appearing as statesman, sophists, and madmen, but really being philosophers.

5. The "saying of Homer" as related by Socrates and what Homer actually said

6. Socrates appearing to be alarmed by the arrival of the Stranger, but no doubt being delighted to have someone new and interesting to talk to.

7. A dialogue that appears to be about the sophist but is really about the combination of temperance and courage in the philosopher.